Windows reanimator extreme edition

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In malicious campaigns, infrastructure is commonly created for specific targets. As an example, an adversary who reuses lure documents or templates may be less experienced, not interested in high-value targets, or using monetized infrastructure from previous campaigns.

Analyzing the metadata from the lure document and template allows us to see when these weaponized documents were created, as well as identify any associations between different elements of the campaign. Additionally, we can see that the remote template was created on December 12, and then modified on December 24, There were 5 modifications to it, indicating that it has been used for 5 campaigns in 12 days — or about 2. With moderate confidence, this tells us that the remote template is likely reused and updated with new macros for new campaigns, and that they were created by the same Author or at a minimum, the same instance of Microsoft Word.

As an analyst note, we see different tool markings that indicate this was created by a Russian speaker Russian Author, Russian Language Code, Cyrillic character set, and the usage of Reanimator Extreme Edition.

In this case, this aligns with other open source analysis linking this to the Gamaredon Group, which is believed to be Russian in origin. The macro code was obfuscated using string concatenation and procedurally generated variables — techniques that are often used to bypass static detection technologies.

Figure 8 contains an excerpt of the macro that depicts the creation of a reverse shell and some of the system information collected automatically. The serial number and hostname of the victim's computer are some of the first pieces of information the VBA collects. They are converted to hexadecimal and included in the reverse shell HTTP request to identify both the implant and the victim.

The first registry modification made by this macro changes the key value of AccessVBOM to 1, effectively bypassing the default setting to enable external or untrusted macros.

The second registry modification enables all macros automatically and disables warnings for future macro-enabled objects. Figure 12 represents the macro code for these registry modifications. Figure 13 contains an excerpt of the beginning lines of macro code where the VBScript security. If the request is successful, the response body gets stored into another variable. This functionality appears to serve as a downloader that has specific subroutine instructions for reassembling a binary on disk.

During dynamic analysis, analysts identified that the script enters a loop while sending the request. The file is iteratively written and deleted without the contents changing. Analysts have not confirmed the purpose of this file, and suspect it is used to reassemble a segmented later-stage implant.

Potential reasons to obfuscate this process include evading detection and response solutions. The two text files share several similarities to the VBA macro code found in the remote templates used in this campaign — specifically, the methods of retrieving and hex-encoding the serial number and similar subroutine logic.

Figure 15 depicts the VBA macro code from the remote template on the left and the dropped VBA macro code from a known Pteranodon implant on the right. Both text files contained VBA, and had the same functionality for disabling macro warnings, creating a persistent VBScript in the startup folder and establishing connections to C2. Macro code associated with the Gamaredon Group campaign targeting Ukraninan officials called back to C2 hosted in the same network.

An interesting change in some of these artifacts appears to be the adoption of. NET sample showing dependencies with these files. Figure 16 shows a hex-encoded reference to one of the VBA files wordMacros. For organizations interested in detecting TTPs discussed in this blog post, detection logic has been provided for the following categories:. Dynamic DNS enables adversaries to rapidly provision very large numbers of records that map back to their infrastructure, creating a confusion layer between victims and adversaries.

Gamaredon Group exclusively used Dynamic DNS locations for remotely hosted templates, rotating domains consistently, and leveraging separate infrastructure for hosting stagers and templates. Profiling Dynamic DNS for your enterprise is an amazing way to get started hunting — not just to baseline and build environmental awareness, but also to outright find evil. We will primarily focus on the two Dynamic DNS providers observed in relation to this campaign, but feel free to extend your profiling of providers by reviewing this extensive post from the Cisco team.

If you need inspiration, consider counting up all non-browser processes that made a DNS request to one of these Dynamic DNS providers as shown in Figure Another option examines the processes that most frequently communicate with these providers, and may provide more context regarding how dynamic DNS is used in your environment, or enable an analyst to find signs of other malicious activity.

Spearphishing attachments that utilize template injection may bypass security controls because they contain no embedded VBA code. The attached document retrieves a remotely hosted template where the malicious VBA code resides. Enterprise defenders may need to whitelist any legitimate use of remotely hosted templates, or any benign network activity to Microsoft infrastructure. Below is an example EQL query focused on new process creation events from Office products that also made DNS requests outside our whitelist.

Some enhancements we can use with the previous query is to add a network event to the sequence as well as look for a spawned child process bringing in more context to the detection.